Undercover Investigations Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT’s Drug Testing Program

In the beginning of 2007, an unfavorable undercover news release was aired on public television and prime internet sites pointing out the deficiencies within the DOT collection procedures at various collection sites. In this particular case, the broadcast just so happened to be conducted in the state of Minnesota, the home state of Congressman James L. Oberstar, D-Minn. who also happens to be the chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

The broadcast in turn prompted Oberstar to call for a wider investigation and asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to take a closer look at the issue. This in turn, prompted GAO to conduct their own undercover investigation, and lead to the release of a 28 page report on November 1, 2007 that not only uncovered the deficiencies within the DOT collection procedures at a variety of the collection sites, but also uncovered the vast availability of products designed to defeat or manipulate drug tests by drug users.

Based on the shocking findings in the undercover investigation, a further study was conducted and the findings in a separate 74 page report were released in late May. We will have a recap of this report in the July publication of the CTN.

In the world of safety, especially relating to the transportation industry, hindsight unfortunately doesn’t factor in as a proactive measure and many lessons must be learned by trial and error. I must admit that these findings have not come as a shocking revelation to many of us involved in the day-to-day operations of the drug and alcohol testing industry. It is compelling to see that finally there is hope for congressional measures to expedite some of the solutions to the loopholes that plague the integrity of the testing process and ultimately the safety of the motoring public. Generally speaking, most truckers do not do drugs, but those that do and the service agents that enable them, have for too long blatantly ignored these regulations and that’s not acceptable to those of us who do follow the regulations. Providing fixes to the numerous loopholes identified within this report is supported both by industry and the enforcement community.

Why GAO Did This Study:
To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals in safety-sensitive positions, the Department of Transportation (DOT) requires motor carriers to conduct drug testing of their employees. These drug tests involve collecting a urine specimen from employees. To ensure the integrity of the urine specimen and the collection process, DOT regulations provide numerous protocols that outline collection procedures and identify controls to prevent employees from defeating a drug test.

Recent media accounts indicate that some sites performing DOT drug test collections may not be adhering to the collection protocols. Moreover, given the different techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to defeat a drug test, it is possible that a commercial truck driver could defeat a drug test by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine specimen in order to obtain a passing result. GAO was asked to perform an undercover operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors followed DOT protocols at selected collection sites and (2) commercially available products could be used to defeat drug tests.
To perform this undercover operation, GAO created two fictitious trucking companies and produced bogus driver’s licenses. GAO investigators then posed as truck drivers to test 24 collection sites throughout the United States.

What GAO Found:
DOT’s drug testing program is vulnerable to manipulation by drug users, especially given the wide availability of products designed to defeat drug tests. While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by asking GAO undercover investigators to provide identification, investigators successfully used bogus driver’s licenses to gain access to all 24 sites—demonstrating that a drug user could send someone to take a drug test in their place using fake identification. In addition, 22 of the 24 selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow the remaining protocols GAO tested. For example, 75 percent of the urine collection sites GAO tested failed to restrict access to items that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that running water, soap, or air freshener was available in the bathroom during the test.

GAO also found that drug masking products such as adulterants, dilutants, and substitutes were widely available on the Internet. After purchasing drug masking products from web sites, GAO investigators used adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic urine at another four sites without being caught by site collectors—demonstrating that these products could easily be brought into a collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding administration of the test, investigators were still able to substitute synthetic urine for their sample. Every drug masking product went undetected by the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant GAO used would be able to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely be able to use the substances GAO tested to obtain a passing result on his or her test. According to officials GAO interviewed at the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), companies that make drug-masking products are aware of government test standards and devise products that prevent laboratories from detecting them. SAMHSA is required to provide information to laboratories on how to test the validity of the urine specimens, publicly providing detailed information on lab testing procedures on its Web site.

Testimony before the Subcommittee of Highways and Transit, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives; statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our undercover operation to test Department of Transportation (DOT) drug testing regulations as they relate to commercial truck drivers. According to DOT, its regulations implement the world’s largest drug and alcohol testing program covering six DOT operating administrations and over 12.1 million employees in the United States, including school bus drivers, commercial truck drivers transporting hazardous materials, and airline pilots. We focused our efforts on the DOT drug testing program for commercial truck drivers, which DOT considers to be a safety-sensitive transportation position. If an employee in a safety-sensitive transportation position were using controlled substances such as marijuana, cocaine, or phencydidine (PCP), a clear public safety risk would exist.

To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals holding safety-sensitive positions, federal law requires motor carriers to drug test their employees. Motor carriers in the United States are responsible for conducting the drug testing of their employees and can use third-party administrators to help them coordinate the drug tests. Drug tests involve collecting a urine specimen from the employee at a collection site. As long as the collection site meets the requirements of DOT’s regulations; urine collection can be performed at sites across the nation, in addition to being performed onsite at an employer’s facilities. DOT regulations contain numerous control measures intended to ensure the integrity of the urine specimen and the collection process during these tests. However, a drug using employee may attempt to defeat a drug test using techniques commonly known as substitution, dilution, and adulteration. To prevent an employee from defeating the drug test, DOT regulations mandate that collection sites follow certain protocols, for instance:

* DOT protocols require collectors to validate that an employee is carrying photo identification before the test. This is designed to prevent an employee from having somebody else take the test for him or her, which is one form of substitution.

* DOT protocols require collectors at drug testing sites to ensure that no clear water source is available in the collection area, among other measures, to prevent an employee from using water in the bathroom to dilute their urine specimen.

* DOT protocols specify that employees should not be able to access soap, air freshener, or other chemicals to prevent them from using these products to adulterate a urine specimen. Other DOT protocols designed to prevent adulteration require employees to empty their pockets and wash their hands before providing the specimen.

Recent media accounts indicate that some private sector collection sites performing DOT drug test collections may not be adhering to established collection protocols. Moreover, given the different techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to defeat a drug test, it is possible that a commercial truck driver could defeat a drug test by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine specimen in order to obtain a passing result.

Conclusion:
Our work shows that a drug user could easily pass a DOT drug test and continue to work in his or her safety-sensitive commercial transportation job--driving children to school or transporting hazardous materials, for example. To fully address the vulnerabilities we identified, improvements will need to be made in both the design of the entire process and the ability of collection site employees to adhere to current protocols. In ongoing work, expected to be complete in May 2008, GAO is examining options to deal with these and related drug testing issues.

To view the full copy of the GAO report, Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT’s Drug Testing Program – Testimony before the Subcommittee of Highways and Transit, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, including the scope and methodology, click on www.gao.gov/htext/d08225t.html.

For more information, contact Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or email him at kutzg@gao.gov.

Sincerely,

Lonnie Johnson
Operation Director